Contrary to Skidelsky (2026, pp.14-16), Keynes was a very powerful, mathematical logician

Authors

  • Michael Emmett Brady California State University System image/svg+xml Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24333603

Keywords:

Keynes’s formal, symbolic mathematical logic, relational, propositional logic, first order, predicate logic, Boolean logic, Boolean indeterminate probabilities, Keynesian non -numerical probabilities, interval valued, upper-lower, bounded probabilities

Abstract

It was impossible for R. Skidelsky to understand Keynes’s logical theory of probability, as presented in Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability, because he had no training in formal, symbolic logic, mathematics, probability or statistics. He was ignorant of the type of formal, symbolic, mathematical logic that was the foundation for all five Parts of the A Treatise on Probability, which was Boole’s relational, propositional (statement, sentential) logic and a first order, predicate logic that Keynes used throughout his A treatise on Probability. Skidelsky, much like G L S Shackle, was unable to read even the basic, introductory chapters I and II of the A Treatise on Probability, which are mainly summaries made by Keynes of Boole’s earlier work in chapter I of The Laws of Thought (1854) on relational, propositional logic and argument forms.

Given the great technical, mathematical deficiencies in Skidelsky’s training, the obvious solution would have been for Skidelsky to seek expert technical advice. Unfortunately, at no time in his life did Skidelsky attempt to obtain any help from mathematicians or logicians, who could have explained to Skidelsky what it was that Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability-building on the foundations provided by Boole in his The Laws of Thought. Instead of seeking the advice of technically trained experts, Skidelsky substituted the insinuations, musings, ruminations, canards and ravings of F P Ramsey, J. Robinson, R Harrod and G L S Shackle, none of whom understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability, which was to further develop the first technically advanced, logical theory of probability as presented by George Boole in his 1854 The Laws of Thought.

References

Aristimuño, F. J., & Crespo, R. (2021). The early Enlightenment roots of Keynes’ probability concept. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 45(5), 919–932.

Aristimuño, F. J. (2025). J. M. Keynes and the history of probability: The influence of Locke, Leibniz, and Hume. Routledge.

Armendt, B. (2005). Ramsey, Frank Plumpton. In S. Sarkar & J. Pfeifer (Eds.), The philosophy of science: An encyclopedia (pp. 671–680).

Arthmar, R., & Brady, M. E. (2016). The Keynes-Knight and the de Finetti-Savage approaches to probability: An economic interpretation. History of Economic Ideas, 24(1), 105–124.

Arthmar, R., & Brady, M. E. (2017). Reply to Feduzi, Runde, and Zappia. History of Economic Ideas, 25(1), 55–74.

Backhouse, R., & Bateman, B. (2018). Keynes, John Maynard (New perspectives). In S. Durlauf & L. E. Blume (Eds.), The New Palgrave dictionary of economics. Palgrave Macmillan.

Bateman, B. (1987). Keynes’s changing conception of probability. Economics and Philosophy, 3, 97–119.

Bateman, B. (1989). “Human logic” and Keynes’s economics: A comment. Eastern Economic Journal, 15(1), 63–67.

Bateman, B. (1990). Keynes, induction, and econometrics. History of Political Economy, 22(2), 359–380.

Bateman, B. (1992). Response from Bradley Bateman. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4), 206–209.

Bateman, B. (2016). Review of Frank Ramsey (1903–1930): A sister’s memoir. History of Political Economy, 181–183.

Bateman, B. (2021). Pragmatism and probability: Re-examining Keynes’s thinking on probability. Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 43(4), 619–632.

Boole, G. (1958). An investigation of the laws of thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probability. Dover Publications. (Original work published 1854)

Boole, G. (1854). On conditions by which solutions of questions in the theory of probabilities are limited. The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science, 8(4th series), 91–98.

Borel, É. (1924). À propos d’un traité de probabilités. Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, 98, 321–336.

Bradley, S. (2019). Imprecise probabilities. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2019 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/imprecise-probabilities/

Brady, M. E. (1983). The foundation of Keynes’ macroeconomics: His logical theory of probability and its application in the General Theory [Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Riverside]. ProQuest.

Brady, M. E. (1987). J. M. Keynes’ theory of evidential weight: Its relation to information processing theory and application in the General Theory. Synthese, 71, 37–60.

Brady, M. E. (1988). J. M. Keynes’s position on the general applicability of mathematical, logical, and statistical methods in economics and social science. Synthese, 76(1), 1–24.

Brady, M. E. (1993). J. M. Keynes’ theoretical approach to decision making under conditions of risk and uncertainty. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44, 357–376.

Brady, M. E. (1994). On the application of J. M. Keynes’s approach to decision making. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 8(1), 99–112.

Brady, M. E. (1996). Decision making under risk in the Treatise on Probability: J. M. Keynes’ “safety first” approach. History of Economics Review, 25, 204–210.

Brady, M. E. (1997). Decision making under uncertainty in the Treatise on Probability: Keynes’ mathematical solution of the 1961 Ellsberg two-color ambiguous urn ball problem in 1921. History of Economics Review, 26, 136–142.

Brady, M. E. (2004a). J. M. Keynes’ theory of decision making, induction, and analogy: The role of interval-valued probability in his approach. Xlibris Corporation.

Brady, M. E. (2004b). Essays on John Maynard Keynes and …. Xlibris Corporation.

Brady, M. E. (2014, February 17). A study of Ramsey’s extremely poor reading of Chapter III of J. M. Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability and the refutations made by J. M. Keynes and Bertrand Russell. SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2397404

Brady, M. E. (2016). Reviewing the reviewers of J. M. Keynes’s A Treatise on Probability: Ignorance is bliss. Xlibris Press.

Brady, M. E. (2021, February 15). Why did F. P. Ramsey never repeat the claims he had made on the first page of his January 1922 Cambridge Magazine three-page note concerning Keynes’s logical theory of probability? It is easy for a reader to see that Ramsey’s review is dead wrong if that reader has actually read A Treatise on Probability. SSRN. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3785695

Brady, M. E. (2022). Overlooking Keynes’s relational, propositional logic leads to error: The case of Bill Gerrard (2003). Academia.edu.

Brady, M. E. (2025). On von Neumann’s 1937 decision to adapt Keynes’s (Boole’s) (a) logical theory of probability, (b) relational, propositional logic, and (c) mathematical lattice structure to represent quantum probability. ResearchGate and Academia.edu.

Brady, M. E., & Arthmar, R. (2010). A road map for economists, logicians, philosophers, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists, and decision theorists seeking to follow the mathematical structure of Keynes’s approach to specifying lower and upper bounds for probabilities in A Treatise on Probability, 1921 (1973). SSRN. https://ssrn.com/abstract=1618445

Braithwaite, R. B. (1973). Editorial foreword. In J. M. Keynes, A treatise on probability (Vol. 8, pp. xiv–xxii). Macmillan.

Broad, C. D. (1922). Review of A treatise on probability. Mind, 31, 72–85.

Carabelli, A. (1985). Keynes on cause, chance, and possibility. In T. Lawson & H. Pesaran (Eds.), Keynes’ economics: Methodological issues (pp. 151–180). M. E. Sharpe.

Carabelli, A. (1988). On Keynes’s method. Macmillan.

Carabelli, A. (2003). Keynes: Economics as a branch of probable logic. In J. Runde & S. Mizuhara (Eds.), The philosophy of Keynes’s economics (pp. 216–226). Routledge.

Carabelli, A. (2021). Keynes on uncertainty and tragic happiness: Complexity and expectations. Palgrave Macmillan.

Carnap, R. (1950). Logical foundations of probability. University of Chicago Press.

Carnap, R. (1955). Statistical and inductive probability; inductive logic and science. The Galois Institute of Mathematics and Art.

Carnap, R. (1962). Logical foundations of probability (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Chick, V., & Dow, S. (2001). Formalism, logic and reality: A Keynesian analysis. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25(6), 705–721.

Clarke, P. (2023). Keynes in action. Cambridge University Press.

Coates, M. (2025). Keynes, Wittgenstein, and probability in the Tractatus. HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, 15(1), 99–124.

Coker, D. C. (2020). Review of Cheryl Misak’s Frank Ramsey: A sheer excess of powers. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 13(2), 197–202.

de Finetti, B. (1985). Cambridge probability theorists (G. Pelloni, Trans.). The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, 53, 348–363. (Original work published 1938)

Dempster, A. P. (1967). Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38, 325–339.

Dempster, A. P. (1968). Upper and lower probabilities generated by a random closed interval. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 39, 957–966.

Dow, S. C. (2005). Axioms and Babylonian thought: A reply. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 27(3), 385–391.

Dow, S. C. (2012). Methodological pluralism and pluralism of method. In A. Salanti & E. Screpanti (Eds.), Pluralism in economics: Theory, history and methodology. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Edgeworth, F. Y. (1922a). The philosophy of chance. Mind, 31, 157–185.

Edgeworth, F. Y. (1922b). Review of John Maynard Keynes’s A treatise on probability. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 85, 107–113.

Fitzgibbons, A. (1988). Keynes’s vision. Oxford University Press.

Franklin, J. (2001). Resurrecting logical probability. Erkenntnis, 55, 277–305.

Gerrard, B. (2022). The road less travelled: Keynes and Knight on probability and uncertainty. Review of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2022.2114291

Gerrard, B. (2023a). Ramsey and Keynes revisited. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 47(1), 195–213. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beac068

Gerrard, B. (2023b). Keynes, Ramsey, and pragmatism. Journal of the History of Economic Thought.

Gerrard, B. (2023c). The development of Keynes’s pragmatist account of the human logic of investment under conditions of uncertainty. SSRN.

Gillies, D. (1972). Review: The subjective theory of probability. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23(2), 138–157.

Gillies, D. (2000). Philosophical theories of probability. Routledge.

Good, I. J. (1962). Subjective probability as the measure of a non-measurable set. In E. Nagel, P. Suppes, & A. Tarski (Eds.), Logic, methodology and philosophy of science (pp. 319–329). Stanford University Press.

Hailperin, T. (1965). Best possible inequalities for the probability of a logical function of events. The American Mathematical Monthly, 72, 343–359.

Hailperin, T. (1986). Boole’s logic and probability (2nd ed.). North-Holland.

Hailperin, T. (1996). Sentential probability logic. Lehigh University Press.

Hansen, P., Jaumard, B., & de Aragão, M. P. (1993). Boole’s conditions of possible experience and reasoning under uncertainty (Technical Report DCC-12/93).

Hansen, P., Jaumard, B., & de Aragão, M. P. (2000). Probabilistic satisfiability with imprecise probabilities. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 24, 171–189.

Hishiyama, I. (1969). The logic of uncertainty according to J. M. Keynes. Kyoto University Economic Review, 39(1), 22–44.

Janeway, W. H. (2020, August). The master and the prodigy. Project Syndicate. https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/review-frank-ramsey-keynes-price-of-peace-by-william-h-janeway-2020-08

Keynes, J. M. (1921). A treatise on probability. Macmillan.

Keynes, J. M. (1973). A treatise on probability (Vol. 8, The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes; R. B. Braithwaite, Ed.). Macmillan. (Original work published 1921)

Keynes, J. M. (1973). F. P. Ramsey. In Essays in biography (The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 10, pp. 335–346). Macmillan. (Original work published 1931)

Koopman, B. O. (1940a). The axioms and algebra of intuitive probability. The Annals of Mathematics, 41, 269–292.

Koopman, B. O. (1940b). The bases of probability. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 46, 763–774.

Koopman, B. O. (1940c). Intuitive probabilities and sequences. The Annals of Mathematics, 42, 169–187.

Kyburg, H. E., Jr. (1995). Keynes as a philosopher. In A. F. Cottrell & M. S. Lawlor (Eds.), New perspectives on Keynes. Duke University Press.

Kyburg, H. E., Jr. (1999). Interval-valued probability. Society for Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications. [Original URL requires verification.]

Kyburg, H. E., Jr. (2003). Are there degrees of belief? Journal of Applied Logic, 1, 139–149.

Kyburg, H. E., Jr. (2010). Logic, empiricism and probability structures. In S. Brandolini & R. Scazzieri (Eds.), Fundamental uncertainty: Rationality and plausible reasoning (pp. 39–58). Palgrave Macmillan.

Kyburg, H. E., Jr., & Smokler, H. E. (1964). Introduction. In H. E. Kyburg, Jr., & H. E. Smokler (Eds.), Studies in subjective probability. Wiley.

MacBride, F., Marion, M., Frápolli, M. J., Edgington, D., Elliott, E., Lutz, S., & Paris, J. (2020). Frank Ramsey. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2020 ed.). https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/ramsey/

Månsson, A. (2007). Quantum state analysis: Probability theory as logic in quantum mechanics [Doctoral dissertation, KTH Royal Institute of Technology].

McCann, C. (1992). More on Keynes and probability. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(4), 206–207.

Mellor, D. H. (1995). F. P. Ramsey. Philosophy, 70, 243–257.

Methven, S. J. (2015). Frank Ramsey and the realistic spirit. Palgrave Macmillan.

Miller, D. W. (2009). The last challenge problem: George Boole’s theory of probability. [Publication details require verification.]

Mini, P. (1994). John Maynard Keynes: A study in the psychology of original work. Macmillan.

Miranda, E. (2008). A survey of the theory of coherent lower previsions. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 48, 628–658.

Misak, C. (2016). The subterranean influence of pragmatism on the Vienna Circle: Peirce, Ramsey, Wittgenstein. Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, 4(5), 1–16.

Misak, C. (2020a). Frank Ramsey: A sheer excess of powers. Oxford University Press.

Misak, C. (2020b, April 7). Pragmatic philosophers: Let’s just focus on the best we can do. CBC Radio. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/idea/pragmatic-philosophers-let-s-just-focus-on--the-best-we-can-do-1.5524895

O’Donnell, R. (1989). Keynes: Philosophy, economics and politics. Palgrave Macmillan.

Ramsey, F. P. (1922). Mr. Keynes on probability. Cambridge Magazine, 11(1), 3–5. Reprinted in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40 (1989), 219–222.

Ramsey, F. P. (1978). Truth and probability. In D. H. Mellor (Ed.), Foundations: Essays in philosophy, logic, mathematics, and economics. Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work written 1926)

Rédei, M. (2001). John von Neumann’s concept of quantum logic and quantum probability. In M. Rédei & M. Stöltzner (Eds.), John von Neumann and the foundations of quantum physics (pp. 153–172). Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Rédei, M. (2007). The Birkhoff–von Neumann concept of quantum logic. In K. Engesser, D. M. Gabbay, & D. Lehmann (Eds.), Handbook of quantum logic and quantum structures: Quantum logic (pp. 1–23). Elsevier.

Runde, J. (1990). Keynesian uncertainty and the weight of arguments. Economics and Philosophy, 6, 275–292.

Runde, J. (1994). Keynes after Ramsey: In defence of A Treatise on Probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 25, 97–121.

Russell, B. (1922). Review of John Maynard Keynes’s A treatise on probability. The Mathematical Gazette, 119–125.

Schervish, M. J., Seidenfeld, T., Kadane, J. B., & Levi, I. (2003). Extensions of expected utility theory and some limitations of pairwise comparisons. In Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications (ISIPTA 2003) (pp. 337–351).

Seidenfeld, T. (2004). A contrast between two decision rules for use with (convex) sets of probabilities: Gamma-maximin versus E-admissibility. Synthese, 140(1–2), 69–88.

Skidelsky, R. (1992). John Maynard Keynes: The economist as savior, 1920–1937 (Vol. 2). Penguin Books.

Skidelsky, R. (2026). Keynes for our times. Yale University Press.

Smith, C. A. B. (1961). Consistency in statistical inference and decision (with discussion). Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 23, 1–37.

Stacey, B. C. (2016). Von Neumann was not a quantum Bayesian. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, 374, Article 20150235. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2015.0235

Walley, P. (1990). Statistically imprecise probabilities. Chapman & Hall.

Weichselberger, K. (2000). The theory of interval probability as a unifying model of uncertainty. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 24, 149–170.

Weichselberger, K. (2007). The logical concept of probability: Foundation and interpretation. In Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications (pp. 455–464).

Wheeler, G. (2012). Commemorating the work of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. Synthese, 186(2), 443–446.

Wheeler, G. (2015). Introduction to the philosophical foundations of imprecise probabilities. Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.

Wilce, A. (2021). Quantum logic and probability theory. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-quantlog/ (Original work published 2002)

Wilson, E. B. (1923). Keynes on probability. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 29(7), 319–322.

Wilson, E. (1934). Boole’s challenge problem. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 29, 301–304.

Zabell, S. L. (1991). Ramsey, truth, and probability. Theoria, 57(3), 211–238.

Zabell, S. L. (2005). Symmetry and its discontents. Cambridge University Press.

Zappia, C. (2025). Uncertainty in economics: A history. Springer.

Downloads

Published

2026-11-18

How to Cite

Contrary to Skidelsky (2026, pp.14-16), Keynes was a very powerful, mathematical logician. (2026). Neewaj Journal of Multidisciplinary Research & Innovations, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24333603

Similar Articles

1-10 of 11

You may also start an advanced similarity search for this article.

Most read articles by the same author(s)